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IMPROVING (AND AVOIDING) INTERSTATE
INTERPRETIVE ENCOUNTERS
AARON-ANDREW P. BRUHL*
State courts often encounter the statutes of other states. Any encounter
with another state’s statutes raises an interesting but inconspicuous question
about choice of law. In particular, the interstate encounter presents a choice
of interpretive law. Despite some universal practices in statutory
interpretation, there are methodological differences across jurisdictions—both
at the level of overall approach and in the details of particular interpretive
canons. When a state court encounters the statute of a sister state, may the
forum state use its own interpretive methods or must it instead use the
methods of the enacting state?
The existing doctrine on this choice-of-law question is unclear,
primarily because of inattention rather than open disagreement. The
inattention is understandable given the historical understandings of
interpretive methodology as either universal law, an application of evidence
law, or not real law at all. But those old conceptions of interpretive
methodology have been changing, with methodology lately coming to be seen
as more or less ordinary law that may differ from place to place. Therefore,
today’s courts and commentators increasingly view methodology as part of
the law that should tag along with state statutes when those statutes come
before other courts.
I largely agree that states must honor other states’ interpretive methods,
but this Essay seeks to advance our understanding in three ways. First, the
Essay grapples with nuances involving whether enacting states mean for their
methods—and which aspects of them—to apply in other courts. Second, it
addresses situations in which a forum state may have legitimate reasons to
resist applying sister-state methodology to a sister-state statute. In such
circumstances of true conflict, the best way to honor the sister state may be
to avoid adjudicating claims under its law altogether rather than to apply its
substantive law in a compromised form. Third, the Essay considers the
potential role of the federal courts in modeling and encouraging compliance
with the general duty to apply sister-state methodology.
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INTRODUCTION
State courts often encounter the statutes of other states. Many such
interjurisdictional encounters are mundane, as when a state court hearing
a negligence case about an in-state car accident must interpret the
insurance code of the neighboring state where the insurance policy was
issued. Other interstate encounters have broader effects, such as when a
state court entertains a putative multi-state class action and must examine
various states’ statutes to discern their meaning and the differences
among them. The end of Roe v. Wade’s1 national right to abortion will
bring litigation over whether certain states’ restrictions apply to attempts
to obtain or aid out-of-state abortions.2 Although some of those disputes
will be litigated in the states that enact the restrictions, other disputes will
arise outside of the enacting state, potentially requiring outsiders to
interpret the statutes. The Texas statute known as S.B. 83 creates civil
liability for those who perform or aid abortions, possibly including those
who do so outside of Texas. S.B. 8 has already required interpretation in
sister states.4 Political polarization across states means that sharp
interjurisdictional clashes over abortion and other topics are unlikely to
subside and—if anything—these clashes will increase.5
Whether headline-grabbing or not, any encounter with another
state’s statute requires interpretation to determine the statute’s scope and
1.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2.
See, e.g., Caroline Kitchener, Missouri Lawmaker Seeks to Stop Residents
from Obtaining Abortions out of State, WASH. POST (Mar. 8, 2022, 2:21 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/03/08/missouri-abortion-ban-texassupreme-court [https://perma.cc/5NNS-V63M].
3.
Texas Heartbeat Act, 2021 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 62 (codified in TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.201–.212 (West 2021)).
4.
See Ann E. Marimow, Abortion Rights Advocates, in ‘Legal Limbo,’ Go
out of State to Try to Block Texas Law, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2021, 4:47 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/abortion-braid-texasillinois/2021/10/05/7e1f67f4-260b-11ec-9de8-156fed3e81bf_story.html
[https://perma.cc/H9LP-8CCT].
5.
See Shawn Hubler & Jill Cowan, Flurry of New Laws Move Blue and Red
States
Further
Apart,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
4,
2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/03/us/state-laws-republican-democrat-division.html
[https://perma.cc/G6HH-5B3T].
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content. Sometimes the interpretation of a statute barely registers as
interpretation at all, as when one understands S.B. 8’s statutory penalty
of “not less than $10,000”6 to mean 10,000 of today’s United States
dollars, not, say, the current value that corresponds to 10,000 Spanish
silver dollars at the time Texas adopted its constitution. Yet, even
something as simple as a dollar value can conceal interpretive problems.7
Other statutory provisions are so complex, ambiguous, vague,
conflicting, or otherwise unclear that the need for interpretation jumps
off the page.
The need to interpret requires an interpretive approach. While some
universals exist in statutory interpretation—as they do in torts and
contracts—there are also differences across jurisdictions. Some states
expressly and self-consciously embrace versions of textualism, while
others are more purposivist.8 Some states, like Wisconsin, have
developed an interpretive method that moves from one tier to the next;
particular interpretive sources or tools become available only when
sources from the prior tier leave lingering ambiguity.9 Furthermore,
there is diversity at the level of specific rules. States differ in the
formulation or existence of substantive canons like the presumption
against extraterritoriality.10 They have different rules about the value of
administrative interpretations of statutes.11 State legislatures sometimes
expressly aim at changing a specific judicial interpretive practice, such
as by telling courts to use legislative history more expansively (Oregon)
or more sparingly (Connecticut).12

6.
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 171.208(b)(2) (2021),
https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/HS/htm/HS.171.htm [https://perma.cc/NAQ9C324].
7.
For the hidden interpretive problem involving the “Twenty Dollars” Clause
of the Seventh Amendment, which inspires the example in the text, see Lawrence B.
Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269, 281–82 (2017).
8.
See generally Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory
Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE
L.J. 1750, 1775–811 (2010) (describing approaches in several states).
9.
See State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 681 N.W.2d 110, 123–
26 (Wis. 2004); Daniel R. Suhr, Interpreting Wisconsin Statutes, 100 MARQ. L. REV.
969 (2017).
10.
William S. Dodge, Presumptions Against Extraterritoriality in State Law,
53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1389 (2020).
11.
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., JAMES J. BRUDNEY, JOSH CHAFETZ, PHILIP
P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND
REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 1071–74 (6th ed. 2020)
(comparing judicial deference doctrines in different state courts).
12.
On legislative directives in Oregon and Connecticut, see Gluck, supra note
8, at 1782–85, 1791–97. See generally Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common
Law of Statutory Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 378–82 (2010) (discussing legislative
directions).

1142

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

Because interpretive approaches and rules differ, dealing with
another state’s statute involves another choice-of-law layer beyond the
choice to use the statute. That is, upon choosing to apply another state’s
statute, which law of interpretation applies to give meaning to that
statute? If a court in Texas—where courts avoid legislative history unless
a statute is ambiguous—is applying a statute from Oregon—where courts
may consider legislative history regardless of ambiguity—which of those
rules about the use of legislative history applies?13
The existing law on the choice-of-interpretive-law question is
unclear, not so much because of sharp, open disagreement but because
of inattention. When courts explicitly address whether a state court
applying a sister state’s statute should follow the enacting state’s
interpretive approach or use its own, it appears they more often follow
the enacting state’s approach.14 But in what must be a much larger
number of cases, the choice of interpretive law goes unaddressed, and
probably unnoticed, as the court simply interprets the statute as it would
in its usual domestic cases.15 This is understandable, as most states’
interpretive approaches traditionally have not been especially
systematized or distinctive, and even today many are not. If one views
statutory interpretation as merely the application of common sense, or if
one views it as a kind of universal law, there is no particular reason to
wonder which sovereign to consult for guidance on the correct
methodology.16 The choice of interpretive law will become harder to miss
as statutory interpretation becomes more widely regarded as a lawgoverned activity—one in which the governing interpretive law may
meaningfully differ across at least some jurisdictions in some respects.17
This Essay aims to improve states’ encounters with the statutes of
sister states, and it proceeds through four steps. As Part I explains, state
13.
Compare State v. Gaines, 206 P.3d 1042, 1048–51 (Or. 2009), with Tex.
Health Presbyterian Hosp. of Denton v. D.A., 569 S.W.3d 126, 135–36 (Tex. 2018).
14.
See Grace E. Hart, Comment, Methodological Stare Decisis and
Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation in the Choice-of-Law Context, 124 YALE L.J.
1825, 1830–32 (2015). But see Weber v. U.S. Sterling Sec., Inc., 924 A.2d 816, 823

n.5 (Conn. 2007) (“Although we apply the substantive law of Delaware because [the
company at issue] was incorporated there, procedural issues such as how this court
interprets statutes are governed by Connecticut law.”).
15.
See Zachary B. Pohlman, State Statutory Interpretation and Horizontal
Choice of Law, 70 KAN. L. REV. 505, 507 (2022); see also Hart, supra note 14, at 1830–
32.
16.
See, e.g., Walker v. State, 7 Tex. App. 245, 257–62 (Ct. App. 1879)
(drawing principles of interpretation from Texas cases, other states’ cases, and various
treatises).
17.
See, e.g., Tex. Lottery Comm’n v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 325
S.W.3d 628, 638–39 (Tex. 2010) (rejecting persuasive force of interpretations of similar
statutory language in other states, because those courts and Texas rely on different “rules
of statutory construction”).
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courts interpreting sister-state statutes should generally apply sister-state
interpretive methods. In advocating that proposition, I largely agree with
commentators who have recently addressed this question.18 From there,
the remainder of the Essay aims to advance the debate through several
contributions, all of which stem from the realization that the proposition
just advanced, though a good starting point, must confront certain
complexities. As Part II explores, there are circumstances in which a
forum state may have legitimate, administrative reasons not to apply
another state’s methods—and in which the enacting state may not even
intend for other states to do so. Then, Part III argues that state courts can
sometimes improve their encounters with other states’ interpretive law
by avoiding the encounters, either by using forum substantive law
(despite their earlier inclination) or by abstaining from deciding the
matter entirely. There may also be a productive role for the federal courts
and Congress in improving interstate encounters, as Part IV explores.
Before proceeding, allow me to note a few limitations on this
Essay’s scope. First, the Essay concerns horizontal choice of interpretive
law. I have taken up the federal courts’ use of state interpretive law (i.e.,
statutory interpretation’s Erie19 doctrine) in another work.20 Accordingly,
I do not address the federal courts here except insofar as they can serve
as models for the state courts through their rulings in “diagonal” cases,
those in which a federal court sitting in one state interprets the law of a
different state.21 Second, this Essay concerns statutory interpretation;
similar principles likely apply to interpretation of other states’
constitutions or regulations, but the interpretation of other states’
common law presents rather different issues.22 Third, I address states’
application of the statutes of their sister states, not their application of the
statutes of foreign countries. (Thus, subsequent use of “foreign” should
be understood as synonymous with “sister state.”) Similar principles may
apply to international encounters, but the constitutional constraints and
traditional practices both differ in ways that provide states with greater

18.
19.
20.

See Pohlman, supra note 15; Hart, supra note 14.
See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Interpreting State Statutes in Federal Court,

NOTRE
DAME
L.
REV.
(forthcoming),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3978040. See also Abbe R.
Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie
Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898 (2011) (addressing Erie and “reverse Erie” situations).
21.
See infra Part IV.
22.
See generally Nina Varsava, Stare Decisis and Intersystemic Adjudication,
97 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1207 (2022) (addressing the interpretation of precedent across
the federal-state divide).
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freedom when confronted with the laws of foreign countries as compared
to the laws of their sister states.23
I. THE GENERAL DUTY TO APPLY ENACTING-STATE METHODOLOGY
Faithful application of a state’s choice-of-law rules generally leads
to the conclusion that application of a statute from a sister state also
requires application of the enacting state’s interpretive methods. The
precise reasoning that leads to that result depends on the forum state’s
approach to choice of law. However, to generalize, the reasons to choose
the substantive law of the sister state usually serve as reasons to apply
the interpretive methods as well.24 That is, a state applying a sister-state
statute does so because of the enacting state’s interest in regulating
primary conduct connected with the enacting state or bringing about some
real-world result in which the enacting state is legitimately interested.
For the enacting state, accomplishing those policy goals depends not only
on the words in its statute book but also on how judges, other officials,
attorneys, and ordinary people understand their legal import (i.e., the
rights and duties and other legal relations the statutes create). Methods
of interpretation provide a bridge between the words on the page and the
legal relations, thereby facilitating the achievement of the state’s goals.25
This is true in the wholly domestic case, and it is true in the interstate
case as well. So, the reasons for applying sister-state law also demand
the application of the sister-state interpretive methodology.
The foregoing line of reasoning is consistent with the
recommendations of other scholars who have recently addressed the
matter. Grace Hart argues that courts should select foreign states’
interpretive methods when interpreting their statutes, emphasizing the
substantive policy impacts of interpretive methodology.26 A recent article
by Zachary Pohlman addresses interjurisdictional statutory interpretation
in both its constitutional and subconstitutional dimensions.27 Pohlman
believes that the decision to apply enacting-state methodology is not
constitutionally compelled and is therefore left to states to decide
individually as their conflicts methodologies direct.28 He contends that
both the traditional territorial approach of First Restatement and the

23.
See generally Nicholas M. McLean, Comment, Intersystemic Statutory
Interpretation in Transnational Litigation, 122 YALE L.J. 303 (2012) (urging courts to
apply foreign interpretive methods to foreign statutes).
24.
See generally Bruhl, supra note 20 (explaining at greater length in the
related context of the federal courts’ duty to apply state methodology).
25.
Id.
26.
See Hart, supra note 14, at 1832–35.
27.
Pohlman, supra note 13.
28.
Id. at 508–09, 548–49.
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“most significant relationship” approach of the Second Restatement,
when properly applied, would select enacting-state interpretive
methods.29
To briefly explain Pohlman’s reasoning, beginning with
territorialism: States have the exclusive right, vis-à-vis other states, to
regulate events in their territory.30 If a right arises under a statute,
application of a different state’s interpretive method invades the enacting
state’s exclusive regulatory power by imbuing the right with a different
meaning.31 Further, the application of forum-state methodology allows
content of the vested right to vary depending on where a suit is brought,
which undermines the uniformity the territorial approach aims to
promote.32 Implicit in the foregoing reasoning is the premise that an
interpretive method is best characterized as “substance” rather than
“procedure,” for under the First Restatement a forum could apply its
own procedures when adjudicating a right that vested elsewhere.33
Although analysis under the Second Restatement is multi-factored
and not always determinate, a faithful application of its methodology,
Pohlman explains, should lead states to use enacting-state interpretive
methodology.34 His essential point is that the reasoning supporting the
conclusion that a sister state has a more significant relationship to the
case—which, depending on the issue, could be due to that state’s greater
interest in regulating the primary conduct at issue, allocating resources
between the parties, or protecting parties’ expectations about the
consequences of their actions—likely similarly supports applying the
enacting state’s method of giving meaning to its statute.35 This is
especially true when the enacting state has a clearly articulated, regularly
followed methodology.36
While I am mostly in agreement with Hart and Pohlman in that states
should generally apply other states’ interpretive methods when applying
other states’ statutes, there are a few important caveats and
complications.
The first complication, addressed only briefly here, is the possibility
that interpretive methodology is not binding law at all. Here I refer to the
view that, even in purely domestic cases, interpreters are not legally
obliged to obey general approaches or particular rules. Now, it is true
29.
Id. at 513–14.
30.
See id. at 514.
31.
Id. at 549–50.
32.
Id. at 550.
33.
Id. at 541, 544–48; see RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 585 (AM.
L. INST. 1934).
34.
Pohlman, supra note 15, at 514, 553.
35.
Id. at 550–55.
36.
Id. at 552.

1146

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

that some (or many) aspects of interpretation are fuzzy in application and
inconclusive in effect, even taken sincerely on their own terms. Certain
jurisdictions may leave much to individual judicial philosophy. And
interpreters, as a descriptive matter, may violate the norms here as
elsewhere, maybe more often here because of the fuzziness. But, as some
of us have argued at length, there is at least a meaningful amount of
interpretive law—approaches, presumptions, tiebreakers, closure rules,
and rules of admissibility—that courts are required to follow when their
triggering conditions are satisfied.37 The amount of such law is probably
growing over time as courts and legislatures become more conscious of
methodology, which makes the choice-of-law questions more pressing.
The complications that will occupy most of the rest of this Essay are
different in that they concern reasons for a forum state to eschew the
application of enacting-state methodology even if one generally believes
that at least some methodology is binding in domestic cases in the statuteenacting state.
II. THE POSSIBILITY OF TRUE CONFLICTS OVER INTERPRETIVE
METHODOLOGY
To elaborate on and complicate the general duty to follow enactingstate methodology, this Essay uses language of state interests. That is not
because I adopt the entirety of Brainerd Currie’s approach,38 but rather
because thinking about the interests of the enacting and interpreting
states—the differing natures of the interests on each side and the potential
conflicts between them—is a useful way to illuminate corners of the
problem.39 An examination of the relevant interests provides some further
reasons in favor of applying enacting-state methods but also suggests
some legitimate exceptions to that general duty.

37.
See, e.g., William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation,
130 HARV. L. REV. 1079 (2017); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Eager to Follow:
Methodological Precedent in Statutory Interpretation, 99 N.C. L. REV. 101 (2020);
Pohlman, supra note 15, at 530–40; see also Gluck, supra note 8 (arguing that interpretive
methodology should be treated as law but frequently has not been); cf. Christopher J.
Baldacci, Note, The Common Law of Interpretation, 108 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1247 (2022)
(providing evidence for a “soft,” incremental form of methodological precedent). But cf.
Richard M. Re, Permissive Interpretation, 171 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2023),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4184846 (arguing that judges may
lawfully choose between three traditional rules, none of which is paramount).
38.
See LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS 47–48 (1991) (explaining Currie’s approach); see generally BRAINERD
CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).
39.
See Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking
Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448, 2481 (1999) (“The methodology of interest analysis
is useful because it foregrounds the question of what states are attempting to do.”).
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Let us start with the enacting state and its potential interests in the
use of its interpretive methodology, specifically the use of its
methodology in other legal systems that are applying its substantive law.
If we inquired into the scope of a state’s interpretive methodology, the
people, places, and things that fall within the methodology, as the state
itself sees it, what would we find?40 If an enacting state’s methodology is
not meant to apply outside of its own courts, even from the enacting
state’s own perspective, we might not be faced with any conflict of
interpretive law at all. We would have, in the terminology of interest
analysis, a false conflict (only the forum is interested in the methodology
to be applied) or an unprovided-for case (neither state is interested).41
It is hard to determine the territorial scope of a state’s interpretive
methods simply by observing the behavior of judges and other officials
in the enacting state.42 They are acting within the system, and not
everything they do is meant to apply outside. Suppose that the state
courts, in fully domestic cases, use legal-size paper, follow a textualist
interpretive approach, and limit noneconomic damages. From observing
those practices, we cannot know that the state officials have any interest
in, or have given any thought to, whether all their practices apply
externally when a different state applies at least some aspects of the
enacting state’s law. With regard to the paper size, it is hard to see why
the enacting state would care, and, corroborating that intuition, its
procedural rules probably say something like: “Filings in the trial courts
of this State shall be made on legal-size paper.” Note that I am not yet
talking about a different state’s countervailing interest in regulating the
size of filings in its own courts; for now, I am only considering the
enacting state’s own lack of concern in other courts’ choices about paper
size. For the cap on damages, the enacting state probably does mean for
it to apply (at least in certain configurations of parties), as the cap is at
least partially tied to interests in boosting businesses or keeping prices
low, goals that are undermined if the caps are meaningless across the
state line. Put differently, the paper size is procedural while the damage
caps are probably substantive, when judged from the enacting state’s
perspective. What about the scope of the interpretive method, from the
enacting state’s perspective?
40.
Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 5, § 5.01 (AM. L.
INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, 2022) (explaining the first step in a choice-of-law analysis
under most modern articulations is interpreting the laws at issue to determine their scope
of application from the enacting states’ perspectives).
41.
See BRILMAYER, supra note 38, at 47 (explaining the use of these terms in
interest analysis).
42.
I elide here the complication of a state in which the courts and the
legislature disagree on the proper method or the proper scope of the method. That is, I
assume that the enacting state’s legislature and its courts agree on the interpretive regime
and whether it applies to foreign courts.
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A rational state would have an interest in the application of at least
parts of its interpretive methodology wherever its statutes are interpreted.
What the statutes on the books actually achieve depends on how they are
interpreted and applied, which makes methodology important. To the
extent the enacting legislature contemplates any interpretive regime when
considering the real-world effect of its enactments, it is the method it
created or its courts regularly use, at least where the state has a
discernible method.43 Moreover, a reasonable lawmaker would have
second-order interests in the cohesive interpretation of its statutes
wherever they may find their way. In a world without a universal
approach, this consistency is promoted by the enacting-state, interpretive
regime following the substantive law.
We do not have to rely only on suppositions about what a sensible
lawmaker would want. Although state legislatures often lack any actual
intent about the territorial reach of their laws,44 states occasionally tell us
the scope of their interpretive regimes in the most conventionally
powerful way: through the enacted text that creates the regime. Every
state has some codified interpretive directives, which range from narrow
and banal (e.g., the use of the singular shall be construed to include the
plural) to broad and interesting (e.g., legislative history may be consulted
regardless of textual ambiguity).45 When the directives address their own
scope, they generally indicate on their face that they apply to the
interpretation of the state’s statutes regardless of forum. That is, they say
things like, “this Code” should be interpreted in the specified way or that
a particular canon popular elsewhere does not apply to “the statutes of
this State,” or they direct how courts, without specifying which courts,
should discern “the General Assembly’s” intent.46 They generally do not
43.
As compared to Congress, state legislatures are more knowledgeable about
and more likely to draft in light of their state interpretive methods. States typically have
quite a few codified rules of interpretation, certainly more than Congress, and some state
courts have well-articulated methodologies known to their legislatures. See Grace E.
Hart, Note, State Legislative Drafting Manuals and Statutory Interpretation, 126 YALE
L.J. 438, 455–62, 467 (2016) (citing state drafting manuals that refer to the state
interpretive methods); see also Carbone v. Nxegen Holdings, Inc., No.
HHDCV136039761S, 2013 WL 5781103, at *4 n.4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 2013) (“It
is presumed that each set of legislators had their own rules of statutory interpretation in
mind when drafting their respective statutes, so their own rules of statutory interpretation
[i.e., the rules of the enacting sister state] should be applied to best implement the
intended meaning of the statute.”).
44.
See BRILMAYER, supra note 38, at 48–54, 89–93.
45.
See Scott, supra note 12, at 350, 371, 381.
46.
E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 4 (Deering 2022); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT.
70/1.01 (1945); MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 8.3 (2022); MINN. STAT. § 645.08 (2021); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 12-3 (2022); 1 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1502, 1901, 1922 (1972); VA. CODE
ANN. § 1-201 (2022); UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-2(1) (LexisNexis 2022); WIS. STAT. §
990.001 (2019–20).
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make statements directed only at their own courts, like telling “the courts
of this State” to interpret statutes by doing X.47 The directives are more
often placed in the part of the state code dealing with the legislature rather
than the part dealing with the courts.48 Although each state presents a
separate question, it is a fair generalization that state interpretive
directives are written to govern the interpretation of state statutes in all
courts. Perhaps the legislatures wrote these statutes without thought to
their scope, but, to reiterate, making the directives follow the statutes
into other courts generally makes sense.
When we turn to interpretive regimes generated by the state courts
rather than by the legislatures, it is harder to find statements defining any
intended scope, even in states that self-consciously articulate their
approaches. State courts tend not to have much occasion to address the
reach of their interpretive methods, since, obviously, they only decide
cases within their own judicial system.49 Perhaps state courts should
certify to enacting-state courts the question whether the enacting state
regards its interpretive methods (or aspects of them) as binding
elsewhere. Until that happens, we at least have certifications about the
meaning of particular state statutes. When answering certified questions,
courts do not use different interpretive methods from what they already
deploy in non-certification cases.50 That is probably not surprising,
because they are still acting within their own system. Still, at least we do
not see courts saying that a certifying court should interpret the statute
using its own customary methods or whatever other method it pleases.51
Further, in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, it makes
sense that state courts want their judicially announced methodology to
follow the statutes. That result serves the enacting state’s legitimate
interests in several ways: imbuing state statutes with their best meaning
(“best” according to the enacting state, that is), promoting consistent
interpretations of state law and a clear interpretive regime against which
the state legislature can draft, and reducing incentives for horizontal
forum shopping motivated by the hope for a different interpretation.
47.
Cf. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S.
393, 432–36, 433 n.16 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (concluding, in an Erie analysis, that a state statute did not serve to define
rights and remedies under state law by observing, inter alia, that it governed the conduct
of the state’s courts regardless of which substantive law the courts were applying).
48.
E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 174.010 (2021); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 311–
312 (West 2021).
49.
See Michael Steven Green, Law's Dark Matter, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV.
845, 845 (2013) (observing that “whether state authorities intend their legal rules to be
used in other court systems” is a matter about which “the courts of the state whose rules
are at issue have no occasion to discuss”).
50.
See Bruhl, supra note 20, at 35.
51.
Id.

1150

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

Admittedly, a state’s opinion about the proper geographic scope of
its interpretive methodology is an empirical question that warrants
different answers across time and place. Conceivably, a state could
regard interpretive methodology as a matter of “general law,” meaning
its higher courts bind its inferior courts on methods but foreign states’
courts are equally empowered to discern proper methods.52 Further, the
external application of a state’s methodology is not necessarily an all-ornothing binary. For example, a state’s approach may provide, both
internally and externally, that its statutes mean what the legislature
intended (or, alternatively, what an ordinary reader would discern), and
certain presumptions or rules about fixing that meaning may follow the
statutes. But other aspects of the state’s methodology might be
interpreter-relative means of achieving the goal, means required of some
interpreters but not all. In that scenario, the state’s high court might be
required to use legislative history (or corpus linguistics) in pursuit of the
interpretive goal of intent (or ordinary meaning), but other interpreters
might fare better at achieving the same goal by using imaginative
reconstruction (or dictionaries).53 Similarly, certain aspects of a state’s
interpretive method could be motivated by forum-linked “procedural”
interests, such as banning legislative history to reduce burdens on the
courts and bar, burdens the state may be indifferent to regarding foreign
states. Yet, despite these possibilities and caveats, I feel confident saying
that today, most states want foreign courts to follow at least some aspects
of the enacting state’s interpretive methods.
Having canvassed enacting-state interests, we now turn to a forum
state’s potentially conflicting interests regarding methods of statutory
interpretation. Remember that the forum state has chosen to apply foreign
substantive law due to the other state’s stronger connection to the events
in suit (or superior governmental interests or whatever factors matter
under the forum’s conflicts methodology). Those same substantive
considerations should generally impress the forum state enough to apply
the foreign methodology that will determine the statute’s legal meaning
and effect. Still, the use of another state’s interpretive methods could
come into conflict with a forum state’s own interests. Here, I do not mean
52.
Cf. Michael Steven Green, Erie’s Suppressed Premise, 95 MINN. L. REV.
1111, 1126–27 (2011) (describing Georgia’s approach to the common law, which appears
to reflect the pre-Erie view that each court may independently find the common law);
Varsava, supra note 22, at 1249–56 (positing Dworkinian states in which courts have a
duty to make the best constructive interpretation of the law, departing, if necessary, from
the law-supplying state’s own interpretive approaches).
53.
See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How to Read
a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433, 470–84 (2012) (describing
interpretation-relevant institutional differences across courts within a judicial system);
Varsava, supra note 22, at 1258–59 (describing epistemic difficulties in following another
jurisdiction’s law about precedent).
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the forum’s interests in regulating primary conduct, since those interests
were already overcome or nonexistent. Rather, the forum state’s interests
that matter here are those inward-looking interests concerning the
operation of its own judicial system—“procedural” interests, to use the
familiar (if troublesome) term.
Whether we are talking about substantive law or interpretive
methodology, applying the law of another state is more difficult than
applying familiar forum law. To be sure, many cases will not require
significant interpretive effort, because there is on-point substantive
precedent. Even cases of first impression are usually simple enough.
Litigating parties are expected to provide adequate briefing, and legal
reasoning is similar across states. More specifically, many canons and
principles of interpretation are universal or nearly so. And where there
are differences in interpretive approach, state courts can probably handle
a different version of a substantive canon just as they can figure out a
sister state’s view on premises liability or the mailbox rule. All of this is
to say: at least in the typical case of interstate interpretation, the forum
can easily use enacting-state methodology for enacting-state law.
Still, there can be certain situations in which the burden of
applying a different state’s interpretive methodology is acute. Consider
these examples of potentially burdensome interpretive methodologies:
In the State of Breyer, the method for interpretation requires
courts to consult legislative history in every case, as the courts are
to interpret the statute to accomplish the legislative plan, but the
legislative history is not particularly accessible to outsiders (say, it
exists on tape recordings in the state capitol basement or is in
French).
In the State of Lee, the legislature or supreme court has
recently adopted corpus linguistics as the proper way to determine
the ordinary meaning of its statutes, forbidding use of
dictionaries.54 The state appellate judges attend training programs
on the method and sometimes hire clerks with Ph.Ds in corpus
linguistics. A local university establishes itself as the leading
academic center for study of the topic.
In the State of Popularity, the judiciary is elected, and the
interpretive approach is that unclear statutes should be interpreted

54.
See generally Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary
Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788 (2018) (describing corpus linguistics and its use in statutory
interpretation).
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in the way that best fits with the present preferences of the state’s
people.55
Suppose further, consistent with the foregoing discussion, that these
states intend for their interpretive methods to follow their state statutes
into other courts. (I revisit this assumption later, considering the
possibility that these states would not want other states to try to use their
methods.)
Even where the forum state’s choice-of-law rules select the
substantive law of one of the three fictious states above, in recognition
of the sister state’s substantive connections or interests, the forum state
would have a legitimate procedural reason to want to avoid using the
sister state’s methods. The use of legislative history, as its most
sophisticated advocates explain, requires sensitivity to how a legislature
operates and immersion in the particular events that led to a statute’s
enactment.56 And although it is more accessible today, some states’
legislative history really is on tapes in some basement.57 As far as corpus
linguistics goes, it is not for amateurs. Former Justice Thomas R. Lee of
the Utah Supreme Court hired law clerks with advanced degrees in
corpus linguistics and today provides consulting on the topic to help
lawyers understand the method.58 And taking the pulse of Popularity’s
people could be hard for an appointed judiciary in a state at the opposite
55.
See generally Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and
Statutory Interpretation, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215 (2012) (exploring whether approaches

to interpretation should differ according to methods of judicial selection).
56.
E.g., Victoria F. Nourse, Elementary Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking
Legislative Intent and History, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1644–57 (2014) (arguing that both
textualists and purposivists need a more sophisticated understanding of legislative context
in order to recreate the functional equivalent of legislative intent); see also Jesse M.
Cross, Legislative History in the Modern Congress, 57 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 91, 151–53
(2020) (proposing a new hierarchy of federal legislative history based on the capacities
and motivation of the kinds of staffers who produce them).
57.
In Wisconsin, drafting records from before 1999 are available only on
microfiche. A research guide warns, “Drafting records often require explanation or
interpretation. This is why it is recommended that inexperienced researchers do their
work at the [Legislative Reference Bureau], where a number of people on staff can give
expert advice on the use of drafting records.” WIS. LEGIS. REFERENCE BUREAU, LRB-13WB-8, RESEARCHING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN WISCONSIN, at 11, 13–15 (2014). In
Virginia, there are no printed records of legislative debate. The Library of Virginia in
Richmond has videotapes of debates for the years 1981 to 2015. For more recent years,
the recordings can be viewed online. See Fred Dingledy, Legal Research in Virginia,
WM. & MARY L. SCH., https://law.wm.edu/library/research/researchguides/virginia
[https://perma.cc/R79A-RY46] (last visited Oct. 22, 2022).
58.
Jessie Yount, Utah Supreme Court Justice to Launch Corpus Linguistics
Consultancy and Boutique upon Retirement, LAW.COM (June 13, 2022, 12:00 PM),
https://www.law.com/therecorder/2022/06/13/utah-supreme-court-justice-to-launchcorpus-linguistics-consultancy-and-boutique-upon-retirement [https://perma.cc/LG5JRRTX].
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end of the country and the political spectrum.59 Should one entertain
expert testimony on public opinion?
Note that a forum state could have a legitimately nondiscriminatory
interest in avoiding certain methods even if the forum state uses those
methods for interpreting its own statutes.60 After all, understanding one’s
own state’s legislative history, recognizing its leading characters, and
accessing it in the basement of the capitol building across the street may
be less burdensome that using another state’s legislative history (or
assessing the pulse of its people).
Forum interests in the operation of the judicial system are not limited
to dollars and cents but can also involve more theoretical commitments.
Imagine a state that embraces the conception of law as integrity, such
that the judge’s duty is to make the best constructive interpretation of a
statute—to find the “true” law of the other state—even if the other state’s
interpretive methods may yield different results.61 This view is
comprehensible, but I do not believe it reflects the way today’s courts
usually think about the statutory law of foreign states.62 But consider
another philosophy, one more congenial to the textualist zeitgeist.
Suppose the constitution of the State of Textia provides, “No court of
this State may consult legislative history when interpreting a statute of
this State or any other state.” One gets to the same place if the Textia
Supreme Court interprets its state constitution’s “judicial power” to bar
its courts from using legislative history. Textia might embrace this
position due to concerns about the burden on its courts and bar, or maybe
it believes that the use of legislative history imperils its deeply held value
of judicial restraint. Either way, the important point is that Textia’s
grounds for objecting to legislative history are “procedural” in that they
are directed at its own courts but are independent of the source of the
substantive law being interpreted.63 In that regard, Textia differs from
Breyer State both in the direction of its attitude toward legislative history
59.
Bruhl & Leib, supra note 55, at 1271.
60.
On certain kinds of discrimination against sister-state law as a violation of
full faith and credit, see Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 578 U.S. 171, 176–79
(2016); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611–14 (1951); Roosevelt, supra note 39, at
2511–16.
61.
See Varsava, supra note 22, at 1249–56.
62.
Note the two qualifications. The Dworkinian view may be more
descriptively accurate for case law (Varsava’s focus) and domestic law, versus statutes
from other states. See id.
63.
Textualists’ objections include these court-focused strands but also draw on
features of the relevant constitution’s lawmaking procedure. See generally John F.
Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997)
(rooting objections to legislative history in Article I considerations). That latter kind of
objection should not justify a court’s refusal to consider legislative history for statutes
from sister states that do not, under their own constitutional structure, see any problem
with using legislative history. See Pohlman, supra note 15, at 555 n.247.
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(opposed versus solicitous) and in the scope of its regulation of the use
of legislative history, as Breyer’s method is statute-following but forumindependent. Notice that Textia’s ban does not facially discriminate
against the law of other states, for it bars legislative history across the
board.
In the scenarios I have sketched out, a forum state has practical or
theoretical reasons, rooted in the administration of its own judicial
system, for not using the methods of Breyer, Lee, and Popularity. So,
what then? We have a situation in which the forum state, by the lights of
its own conflicts methodology, believes it should apply sister-state law.
Yet the forum state has reasonable judicial-administrative interests in
avoiding the sister-state method. Not every encounter with another state’s
interpretive methodology will trigger such concerns—most will not—but
some will. What should the court do to resolve that clash?
III. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT
As a first step to resolving the conflict, it is important to distinguish
between cases in which the forum may apply its own substantive law as
a constitutional matter and those in which it may not.

A. When the Forum State Has Legislative Jurisdiction
Consider first the situation in which the forum state applies the
substantive law of a sister state as its conflicts methodology so directs but
in which it is nonetheless constitutionally permissible for the forum to
apply its own substantive law. (Under today’s permissive Supreme Court
doctrine governing state choice of law, a state may apply its own law as
long as the state has some significant regulatory interest in the case, even
if another state has an objectively stronger regulatory interest.)64 Suppose
further that this is one of those circumstances described in Part II, in
which the forum court has grounds not to apply the foreign interpretive
methods. If the forum state is going to adjudicate the issue, I would allow
it to respond to the burden by applying its own substantive law after all,
despite what its conflicts methodology would otherwise direct.
There are a few reasons for allowing the forum to return to its own
substantive law despite the initial answer yielded by its conflicts
principles. First, judicial convenience is an explicit factor in some
existing conflicts tests, and it is a legitimate ground for preferring forum
law to hard-to-discern foreign law no matter how substantive the issue.65
64.
See Phillips Petro. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821–23 (1985); Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981).
65.
See Heath v. Zellmer, 151 N.W.2d 664, 672 (Wis. 1967) (“Whatever other

factors might favor the adoption of a foreign rule, a court will not lightly consider a rule
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Second, although magnanimity is to be applauded in choice of law (and
magnanimity is almost all we have, under current Supreme Court
doctrine), it is better for the forum to take the more “selfish” course of
applying forum substantive law to the dispute when the alternative is to
apply sister-state law through a method that is by the sister state’s lights.
Disregarding interpretive methods that the enacting state means to travel
with its statutes is a poor way to respect sister-state lawmaking and lawinterpreting power. In fact, ignoring sister-state methodology while
applying its substantive law may even raise constitutional concerns.66
As an alternative, the forum state might certify a question to the
enacting state or abstain under the state doctrine of forum non
conveniens, unfamiliarity with applicable law being a typical factor in a
forum non conveniens analysis. I take up these strategies of avoidance in
greater detail below.67
Finally, a forum state’s freedom to reject the use of sister-state law
because of interpretive difficulties may act as a slight disincentive to the
adoption of externally burdensome, interpretive methods. Within
constitutional limits, each state may choose its own distinctive methods,
but those choices do have consequences for other states, which would be
well for states to remember when making the choice.

B. When the Forum State Lacks Legislative Jurisdiction
Now comes the harder situation. Suppose the forum state lacks a
sufficient connection to or regulatory interest in the events in suit to
support applying its own substantive law as a matter of federal
constitutional law. It therefore appears that the forum state must apply
the sister-state statute. Yet, the forum has reasons that are rooted in the

that will complicate its task or make the process of case deciding more onerous for itself
or for the bar of its state.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (AM.
L. INST. 1971) (“[T]he factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include
. . . ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.”); Robert A.
Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REV.
1584, 1586–88 (1966); Michael Steven Green, Horizontal Erie and the Presumption of
Forum Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1237, 1289 (2011).
66.
As explained more fully below, there is a constitutional duty of minimal
fidelity when using sister-state law, which intentional disregard of the proper interpretive
method could implicate. See infra Section III.B.1. I am not certain of the argument even
in the context set forth below, namely the situation in which the forum state lacks
legislative jurisdiction. It is weaker here, where there is legislative jurisdiction, as any
misconstruction of foreign law—no matter how intentional or egregious—could arguably
be recast as domestic law. See Note, Misconstruction of Sister State Law in Conflict of
Laws, 12 STAN. L. REV. 653, 653, 657 n.24 (1960). But see Green, supra note 65, at
1280–81, 1286–89 (rejecting the foreign-law-as-domestic-law rejoinder).
67.
See infra Section III.B.2.
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operation of its judicial system to resist using the sister-state method.
What then?
1. THREE BAD OPTIONS
There are apparently three options for how to decide the matter
despite the clash of enacting-state and forum interests:

Option 1
The forum is constitutionally permitted to apply its own
substantive law after all, notwithstanding its lack of otherwise
constitutionally sufficient connection to the case, because of the
forum’s procedural interest in judicial administration, which is
triggered by the foreign interpretive method.
Option 2
The forum remains constitutionally obligated to apply sisterstate substantive law, and it must also apply sister-state
interpretive methods.
Option 3
The forum remains constitutionally obligated to apply sisterstate substantive law, but the forum may apply its own
interpretive method to it.
None of these options is ideal. Consider the downsides of each:
Option 1’s viability turns on whether the forum’s procedural interest
in avoiding the foreign interpretive method can itself provide the
justification for using forum substantive law. This does not seem
permissible even under the current lenient constitutional doctrine, as the
Supreme Court has rejected judicial convenience as a ground for a
substantively uninterested state to apply its own substantive law.68 That
is the lesson of Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts,69 in which the Kansas
Supreme Court wanted to apply Kansas law to all the plaintiffs’ claims
in a multi-state class action, Kansas-linked or not, in order to facilitate
and ease the administration of the class action.70 That basis for using
forum law was impermissible, in the Supreme Court’s view.71
Moreover, letting the forum’s procedural interest expand the range
of cases to which forum substantive law can be applied would create bad
68.
See Phillips, 472 U.S. at 821–23.
69.
472 U.S. 797 (1985).
70.
Id. at 820–23.
71.
Id.; see also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct.
1773, 1780–81, 1783–84 (2017) (holding that the interest in the convenient adjudication
of a case with plaintiffs from many states was insufficient to remedy a lack of contact
between the forum and the out-of-state plaintiffs’ claims, for purposes of Due Process
limits on personal jurisdiction).

2022:1139

Interstate Interpretive Encounters

1157

incentives toward exorbitant applications of forum law. The existence
and severity of a claimed procedural burden associated with a foreign
interpretive method would be hard to assess and harder still for the
Supreme Court to police. Therefore, the risk of abusive applications of
forum law is uncomfortably high.
Option 2 requires the forum to do its best to interpret enacting-state
law as the enacting state would, including application of the enacting
state’s interpretive methods. This view is theoretically attractive, for the
interpretive methods implicate the state’s regulatory interests in the same
way as the words in the statute book. And, to reiterate, this is what a
court should do in most instances, just as a matter of its ordinary choice
of law; that was Part I. But in our hypothetical, the enacting-state
methods burden the forum’s interest in judicial administration.
Moreover, if the foreign method is hard for outsiders to use, bearing the
methodological burdens may not even yield a great result in terms of the
accurate determination of the foreign law.72 Indeed, the prospect of pain
with little gain provides a reason for the forum to double-check whether
the best understanding of enacting-state law really does call for outsiders
to use the burdensome aspects of the methodology, or if instead those
aspects are only interpreter-relative means of finding the law, helpful for
enacting-state courts but not suitable for outsiders.73
Supposing the second look confirms the true conflict, Option 2
requires the forum court to bow to its sister-state’s interests. Now, there
are instances in which current constitutional doctrine takes a hardline
approach, requiring sacrifice of forum interests. Notably, a state is
required to enforce sister-state judgments based on underlying claims that
would be obnoxious to the enforcing state’s public policy.74 That is the
painful compromise current constitutional doctrine does not impose when
it comes to choice of law.75 Maybe it should impose it! That is, maybe
the Supreme Court should reject the principle that a state’s courts need
not sacrifice the state’s own legitimate interests for the benefit of a sister
state with stronger interests.76 Whatever the merits of extending the
demanding approach, the Court does not appear willing to impose it, as
it has flown from a constitutional regime in which the states must balance

72.
See Varsava, supra note 22, at 1258–59 (making a similar point regarding
difficulties in applying another state’s doctrines about precedent).
73.
See supra text accompanying note 49.
74.
Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 234–38 (1908).
75.
See Baker ex rel. Thomas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232–33
(1998) (contrasting the exacting standard of full faith and credit owed judgments with the
lesser standard for laws).
76.
For arguments in favor of stronger duties of fidelity, see, for example,
Green, supra note 65, at 1240, and William B. Sohn, Note, Supreme Court Review of
Misconstructions of Sister State Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1861, 1891–95 (2012).
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interests and, importantly, in which the Court must regularly police the
permissible bounds of forum preference.
Option 3 is a hybrid solution in which the forum may use its own
interpretive methods even though it is constitutionally required to apply
the sister state’s statute. If that is a permissible combination, it is likely
because, as Pohlman argues, interpretive methodology is sufficiently
“procedural” for constitutional purposes even though it is substantive for
purposes of normal choice of law.77 We know that a forum state can
generally apply its own procedure despite lack of substantive regulatory
interests.78
A characterization of interpretive method as procedure does have
some historical heft to it. Start with the old-fashioned notion, inherited
from English practice, that foreign law is a matter of fact to be proven
according to the forum’s rules of evidence, such as rules about expert
testimony and document authentication.79 Inspired by that tradition, state
courts in this country used to treat the law of their sister states as
“foreign” in the relevant sense and, therefore, as a question of fact
subject to proof.80 If foreign law, whether of Italy or Illinois, is regarded
as a question of fact subject to the presentation of evidence, then it makes
sense to say, as the Second Restatement did, that “[t]he local law of the
forum determines how the content of foreign law is to be shown . . . .”81
The factual conception’s assumption that the court knew nothing about
foreign law except what was proven by evidence renders sensible the
view, also found in some old cases, that if no “peculiar construction” of
a foreign statute is proven, the forum court may interpret the statute as
if it were a domestic statute, no other basis for interpreting it being
knowable to the court.82 Furthermore, early understandings of the “law”
77.
Pohlman, supra note 15, at 542–46. Remember that Pohlman believes
states should apply sister-state interpretive methods as a matter of their ordinary conflicts
doctrines. But they are not constitutionally required to do so, because interpretive method
is (on his account) procedural for constitutional purposes. Id.
78.
See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722–31 (1988) (permitting
forum to apply its own statute of limitations, which was treated as at least partly
procedural despite disability to apply its substantive law).
79.
See 1 ALBERT VENN DICEY, J. H. C. MORRIS & LAWRENCE COLLINS, 1
DICEY, MORRIS AND COLLINS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 318 (Lord Collins of Mapesbury
et al. eds., 15th ed. 2012); Arthur R. Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the “Fact” Approach
to Determining Foreign Law: Death Knell for a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV.
613, 617–19 (1967).
80.
See Prudential Ins. Co. Am. v. O’Grady, 396 P.2d 246, 248–49 (Ariz.
1964) (acknowledging, but ultimately departing from, this prior approach to sister-state
law).
81.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 136(2) (AM. L. INST.
1971).
82.
E.g., McKinney v. Minkler, 102 S.W.2d 273, 279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937);
Smith v. Bartram, 11 Ohio St. 690, 691 (1860).
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of interpretation may have regarded it as a matter of universal or general
law (subject to occasional proof of local peculiarity),83 and so asking
which sovereign’s law of interpretation applied would typically not be
worth pondering. Between universal similarity of principles and the
under-theorization of interpretive methodology—features that are only
recently changing—there was probably little perception of choice at all.
The historical treatment of foreign law is relevant because the
Supreme Court’s doctrine of constitutional limitations on state choice of
law draws on historical distinctions between substance and procedure. In
Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman,84 the Court upheld a state court’s choice to
apply its own statute of limitations to claims to which it could not apply
its own substantive law, reasoning that “the society which adopted the
Constitution” regarded limitations periods as “procedural” regulations
and thus within the forum’s authority, regardless of the governing
substantive law or the forum’s lack of connection to the events.85 Justice
Scalia’s opinion for the Court refused to “update” the characterization of
statutes of limitations despite what he described as more modern
scholarly understandings that a limitations period has substantive as well
as procedural aspects.86
Sun Oil itself is not dispositive here and some of its discussion was
arguably unnecessary, because, there, the law-supplying states
apparently regarded their own statutes of limitations as procedural.87
Given that, it is hard to see why another state would have to apply the
statute. With interpretive methodologies, though, there is much reason
to think that the law-supplying states (or at least some states for certain
aspects of methodology) regard their methods as substantive law that
should accompany the statutes.88 Nonetheless, Sun Oil’s mode of analysis
is noteworthy as it gives broad latitude to the forum to apply its own law
to matters that have at least some historical claim to procedural or mixed
status.
Accepting, for the moment, the Sun Oil majority’s historical
approach, I am not convinced that the Constitution blesses the use of
forum interpretive methodology as a categorical matter. Even under the
outmoded practice of treating sister-state law as a fact to be proven,
which triggers the forum procedural interests, a court should not stop at
taking the statutory text into evidence; it should also welcome evidence
83.
Bruhl, supra note 20.
84.
486 U.S. 717 (1988).
85.
Id. at 722–26; see also Townsend v. Jemison, 50 U.S. 407, 413–14 (1850)
(reaching the same result, on the ground that the place of the contract created the right,
but the forum determined whether a judicial remedy was available for a breach).
86.
Sun Oil, 486 U.S. at 726–29.
87.
See id. at 729 n.3.
88.
See supra Part II.
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of the foreign interpretations of the text—and, when needed to determine
the meaning of the text, the foreign interpretive methods too.89 That is,
the interpretive methods are part of the relevant content of the foreign
law that should be put into evidence for the court to find. For example,
if a statute were put into evidence along with a peculiar local rule of
construction in the enacting state, that local rule of construction should
be used in interpreting the statute.90 Similarly, even in the old days of the
factual conception of foreign law, the courts said that the rules for
interpreting contracts were governed by the lex loci.91 In other words,
interpretation was linked with the document being interpreted; it is just
that both were treated as factual rather than legal when they were foreign.
Now set aside Sun Oil’s use of historical understandings and return
to state interests here and now. The forum state’s procedural interests
involving the use of sister-state law look very different today than in the
past. Under current conditions, the forum’s interests in regulating forms
of pleading and modes of proof at trial are irrelevant, as sister-state law
is no longer viewed as a matter of fact to be pleaded and proved through
witnesses and other evidence.92 Today, a Wisconsin state court ascertains
Wisconsin law, California law, and federal law in basically the same
way—reading the parties’ briefs, looking up the relevant statutes and
cases on Westlaw, and maybe going to the library for a treatise. The
Wisconsin court will not take testimony from a retired attorney. 93
Nonetheless, despite the disappearance of forum interests in
regulating evidence and pleading, our hypothetical involving the States
89.
See J.G. COLLIER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 35 (3d ed. 2001); DICEY, supra note
79, at 328–29; see also SOFIE GEEROMS, FOREIGN LAW IN CIVIL LITIGATION: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 183 (2004) (explaining that an English court
may apply “English rules of construction” if “no evidence at all is offered that different
rules govern the foreign court’s interpretation” of its statutes).
90.
See HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND
INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 175–76 (1896) (noting states that differ from the usual
rule about the interpretive value of statutory titles).
91.
See Le Roy v. Crowninshield, 15 F. Cas. 362, 364 (C.C.D. Mass. 1820)
(“It is . . . a principle of public law perfectly beyond the reach of judicial controversy,
that personal contracts are to have the same validity, interpretation and obligatory force
in every other country, which they have in the country where they are made, or are to be
executed.”); Lodge v. Phelps, 1 Johns. 139, 140 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1799) (distinguishing
“the nature and construction of the contract and its legal effect,” which is governed by
lex loci, from “the mode of enforcing it,” which is governed by lex fori); JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 219, 225–32 (1834). Indeed, Sun Oil itself
referred to the traditional understanding that “rules governing the validity and effect of
contracts” were substantive, distinguishing them from “procedural restrictions fashioned
by each jurisdiction for its own courts,” the category into which it put limitations periods.
Sun Oil, 486 U.S. at 726.
92.
E.g., Prudential Ins. Co. Am. v. O’Grady, 396 P.2d 246, 249 (Ariz.
1964); Hennessy v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 968 N.W.2d 684, 692, 695 (Wis. 2022).
93.
See Hennessy, 968 N.W.2d at 692.

2022:1139

Interstate Interpretive Encounters

1161

of Breyer, Lee, and Popularity demands consideration of the potential
problems of judicial administration that certain methodologies may
impose on other states. In a case of first impression under sister-state law
and in which the sister-state’s interpretive methodology involves tapes in
the capitol basement, the forum would be burdened. The burden gives
concrete sense to what Sun Oil said about the forum’s legitimate interests
in “regulating the workload of its courts.”94 And that may be enough to
allow the forum, under the current constitutional regime of “no sacrifices
required,” to apply its own method despite the interference with the
enacting state’s regulatory interest in giving its law its proper meaning.
Finally, recall that even if the Constitution requires application of
sister-state interpretive principles, it would still be hard to show a
violation of that duty under the prevailing standards. The Court has held
that a forum state violates the Constitution only when its misconstruction
of sister-state law “contradict[s] law of the other State that is clearly
established and that has been brought to the court’s attention.”95 And
there apparently needs to be a material difference in law between the
forum and sister-state for there to be a remediable constitutional
violation.96 Interpretive methodology is clearly established in some states
in some respects, but not in all states in all respects. Some aspects of
methodology are both clearly established and differ across states, but
others lack one or both of those features. All of which is to say that a
duty to apply sister-state methodology probably will not be especially
rigorously enforced.
The last several paragraphs were admittedly more thrust and parry
than resolution. To recap, Option 3 allows for a court applying sisterstate law to apply forum methods to the sister-state statute on account of
procedural burdens. Despite laying out the competing considerations, I
am not sure whether that is constitutionally permissible, and the answer
may depend on the particular methodological issues and states involved.
I am more confident that Option 3 is not a good solution. The ideal is for
the law of a state to sound the same in the mouth of another state as it
does at home. However, under Option 3, courts are not trying to do that.
The departure might be justifiable, but it is not ideal.

94.
Sun Oil, 486 U.S. at 730.
95.
Id. at 731.
96.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 816 (1985). I say
“remediable violation” because the Court’s language is perhaps ambiguous as between
whether there is no violation or whether any violation is harmless. Justice Stevens appears
to take the view that there is no violation absent a difference in law, especially regarding
due process. Id. at 824, 837–39 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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2. AVOIDING INTERSTATE INTERPRETATION

All three of the options above are problematic in different ways.
Fortunately, there may be another better option: avoid interpretation.
More precisely, the forum court could deal with the problem of seriously
conflicting interests by abstaining from deciding based on forum non
conveniens or related doctrines.97 Forum non conveniens is often
appropriate in the category of cases addressed here, namely those in
which the forum state, though possessed of jurisdiction to adjudicate,
lacks the power to apply its own substantive law. Some other state would
have adjudicative jurisdiction and otherwise be a suitable forum, most
especially the law-supplying state itself. Add the fact that applying the
other state’s method of interpretation would prove problematic for the
forum court—unfamiliarity with the governing law being another factor
in the forum non conveniens analysis—and the case for abstaining from
the suit is strong indeed.98
If we consider the interests of the states as a group, abstention would
be desirable given the alternatives. As between a system in which states
must either entertain foreign claims and mangle the foreign law or
sacrifice their own legitimate procedural interests, states forging a
hypothetical bargain would probably prefer that the forum yield
jurisdiction to the law-supplying state.99 This is not a scenario, more
troubling, in which a state closes the door to a foreign claim due to
disagreement with the substance of the governing law, its mere
foreignness, or even a desire to preserve resources for claims under
domestic law as a general matter.100
97.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens varies across the states, but almost
every state has it in some form. See William S. Dodge, Maggie Gardner & Christopher
A. Whytock, The Many State Doctrines of Forum Non Conveniens, 72 DUKE L.J.
(forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4060356.
98.
Cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947) (noting the value
of having “a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the case”); Slater
v. Mexican Nat’l R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 128–29 (1904) (affirming dismissal of case
governed by Mexican statute that provided for an ongoing remedy the federal court could
not administer, rather than substituting the lump-sum remedy provided by forum law).
Larry Kramer proposed a similar presumptive solution to conflicts between a foreign
substantive policy and a forum procedure: “In a conflict between a substantive policy and
a procedural policy, the law reflecting the substantive policy should prevail unless the
forum's procedural interest is so strong that the forum should dismiss on grounds of
forum non conveniens.” Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
277, 324 (1990).
99.
Cf. Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Discrimination
and Full Faith and Credit, 63 EMORY L.J. 1023, 1063, 1065 (2014) (describing the
hypothetical desirability of abstention in certain conflicts scenarios).
100. See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612–13 (1951) (striking down a doorclosing statute but suggesting that a forum non conveniens dismissal of a sister-state claim
does not deny full faith and credit).
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Certification would also work, and it is generally less of a burden
on the litigants than abstention. Compared to certification from federal
courts to state courts, certification between states remains rare even in
states where it is authorized.101 This is a missed opportunity. Certification
of difficult questions of first impression under sister-state law has a
number of virtues, all the more so when one adds in complications
stemming from different approaches to interpretation.102
Putting the forum state to the choice between fidelity to sister-state
law and abstention or certification creates good incentives for the forum
state. In particular, putting the forum state to the choice will reveal
whether objections to the burden of the foreign method are serious. If
they are so serious, then the forum state may abstain from the case or
certify the question. There is no need to sacrifice its interests in judicial
administration, as under Option 2 above. If the burdens are not so serious
after all, then it should apply the foreign interpretive method to the
foreign statute that its choice-of-law rules already say should govern the
case. But what is not allowed is for the forum to assert the burden, which
is hard for outsiders to second guess, and then either claim the prize of
applying its own substantive law when it otherwise would not (Option 1)
or mangle the other state’s law through using its own method (Option 3).
Speaking of incentives, there may be good incentives for states on
the law-supplying side too. If a state finds that the burden of receiving
certifications or abstention-generated, new filings outweighs the benefits
of correct articulation of its law, perhaps the state might reconsider its
embrace of an externally burdensome interpretive method. Such a
method is a sort of externality, after all. Alternatively, the law-supplying
state could retain its idiosyncratic method for use in its own courts, where
it presumably finds that its benefits outweigh the costs, but stop expecting
other courts to follow the method. It could so announce the next time it
gets a certified question. The downside of freeing other states of the
obligation to follow the enacting-state’s methods is a reduction in the
accuracy and coherence of the state’s law in cases of first impression that
arise outside of the state. Of course, the state would be able to correct
misapprehensions though later domestic cases.

101. See Ira P. Robbins, Interstate Certification of Questions of Law: A
Valuable Process in Need of Reform, 76 JUDICATURE 125, 127–28 (1992).
102. See Bruhl & Leib, supra note 53, at 1271.
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C. Summary of Prescriptions

To sum up the prescriptions from the discussion above:
I: A court applying the statute of another state should generally
apply the law-supplying state’s interpretive methodology, subject to
confirmation that the law-supplying state means for its methodology
to follow the statute. Here, I agree largely with Hart and Pohlman.

But—

II: If the law-supplying state’s interpretive methodology presents a
judicial-administrative burden (practical or philosophical) that
makes the forum want to depart from the law-supplying state’s
methodology, then—
A: If the forum has the constitutional authority to apply its own
substantive law, it should either (i) apply its own substantive
law after all or (ii) abstain or certify the question.103
B: If the forum court lacks the constitutional authority to apply
its own law, it should abstain or certify the question.

As one can see, in none of the above prescriptions would the forum court
apply its own methodology to a sister-state statute.
It may be helpful to illustrate the propositions above by returning to
a concrete scenario. Consider again S.B. 8, the Texas abortion law.104
Suppose a defensive suit for a declaratory judgment is brought in New
York by a New Yorker who aided a Texas abortion in apparent violation
of S.B. 8. Texas and New York have different views about abortion and
about statutory interpretation.105 If the New York court determines that
S.B. 8 applies, then it should also apply the Texas interpretive method to
it, which would mean applying a more textualist approach than the New
York courts would apply to their own statutes. In the unlikely event the
New York court has an objection to using the Texas interpretive approach
that is rooted in judicial administration, it can certify or abstain.
103. Section III.B.2 addressed abstention when the forum court lacks legislative
jurisdiction, but abstention should also be permissible when the forum has legislative
jurisdiction, as in Section III.A. Because we are addressing cases in which the forum’s
conflicts methodology selects a different state’s substantive law, the enacting state would
likely have the requisite contacts to provide the available alternative forum that forum
non conveniens requires. If so, interstate federalism can tolerate that abstention. See
Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 99, at 1062–67; see also Samuel P. Jordan, Reverse
Abstention, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1771, 1806 (2012).
104. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.201–.212 (West 2021).
105. Compare Gluck, supra note 8, at 1787–91 (describing the textualist
approach of the Texas courts), with Ethan J. Leib, Interpretive Divergence Between
Statutory and Contract Interpretation: A Case Study in the New York Court of Appeals
(unpublished manuscript) (documenting the non-textualist, intent-oriented approach in
New York) (on file with author).
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Of course, the obvious objection to the realism of what I have just
described would be New York’s unhappiness with applying a Texas
statute enacted to penalize real-world conduct New York would
otherwise permit. But that is why New York might not apply S.B. 8 at
all, instead using New York law on abortion for the benefit of its
domiciliary. That choice is driven by substance. And if it is not clear
enough that New York law would apply, or if additional protective
measures against S.B. 8 were desired, New York could pass its own
statute shielding against liability and even imposing reciprocal liability
on S.B. 8 bounty-seekers.106
In the much more common case in which a New York court is
applying something like Texas insurance statutes to an anodyne coverage
dispute, the New York court, if it considered the matter, would likely
apply Texas interpretive methods too.107
IV. THE POTENTIAL FEDERAL ROLE
Thus far, the main audience for my suggestions has been states. Let
me close by considering the potential role of the federal government.
Congress has the authority to do something about state choice of
interpretive law, and indeed, if one did not know better, one might think
it already has. Using its power under the second sentence of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, which allows it to “prescribe . . . the Effect”
of state laws in other states,108 Congress has provided that state statutes
“shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United
States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage
in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are
taken.”109 A naïve reader might take this language to mean that state
statutes must be given the same meaning elsewhere, which in turn would
seemingly require the use of the enacting-state’s interpretive methods.
That reading is bolstered by the fact that the usual rule for judgments is
indeed that they enjoy the same effect everywhere that they have in the
rendering state.110 That means applying the preclusion law of the
rendering state in order to determine the meaning, scope, and preclusive
106.

of-State

See Maya Yang, Pro-Choice States Rush to Pledge Legal Shield for OutAbortions,
GUARDIAN
(May
11,
2022,
4:00
AM),

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/11/abortion-pro-choice-states-safehavens-funding-legal-protection [https://perma.cc/NH9T-KADY].
107. See, e.g., Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. UBS Sec. LLC, No. 13cv6731
(DLC), 2016 WL 1179203 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2016) (applying Texas rules of statutory
interpretation).
108. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
109. 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
110. See, e.g., V.L. v. E.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017, 1020 (2016); Mills v. Duryee,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 484 (1813).
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power of the judgment, subject to forum regulation of the manner of
enforcement of judgments.111
Current doctrine does not support the naïve reading of the command
to give state statutes “the same full faith and credit” they enjoy in the
enacting state. To the contrary, the federally imposed duty to apply and
faithfully interpret sister-state statutes is but slight. Current doctrine finds
a violation in the misconstruction of sister-state law only when the
forum’s interpretation “contradict[s] law of the other State that is clearly
established and that has been brought to the court’s attention.”112 The
Supreme Court has all but ignored the implementing statute in these
decisions, resting instead on the Constitution.113
However little the implementing statute currently matters for the
faithful application of sister-state statutes, Congress could make it mean
more.114 To date, Congress has not done much in this regard, but it is
within Congress’s power to heighten the duty of faithfulness, including
to interpretive methods, or to deny preclusive effect to judgments that
fail to do so, topics I hope to consider in more detail in future work on
congressional power over state interpretive methods.
Finally, we should not forget the federal district courts. The
Supreme Court shows no interest in expanding its role in policing state
choice of law by tightening up the currently lax doctrine,115 but the
district courts could still play a constructive role in improving interstate
interpretation. In prior work, I argued that federal courts interpreting
state statutes should generally use enacting-state methods, which is
happily what they usually do.116 That view complements the position here
that state courts should generally use sister-state methods when applying
sister-state statutes. In the resulting world as I would decree it, the Erie
doctrine, state choice of law, and Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg.
Co.117 would all work together and reinforce each other. But if the state
courts did not apply sister-state methods, the federal courts would need
to let something slip in “diagonal” cases in which a federal court in state
111. See Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380–
81 (1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 93–95, 99 (AM. L. INST.
1971).
112. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730–31 (1988).
113. See David E. Engdahl, The Classic Rule of Faith and Credit, 118 YALE
L.J. 1584, 1656–57 (2009); see, e.g., Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 613 n.16 (1951).
114. See Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95
VA. L. REV. 1201, 1279 (2009).
115. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 578 U.S. 171, 179 (2016)
(disclaiming any “inten[t] to return to a complex ‘balancing-of-interests approach to
conflicts of law’”) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 496 (2003)).
116. Bruhl, supra note 20, at 33.
117. 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (requiring federal courts to use the conflicts rules
of the state in which they sit).
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X applies the law of state Y: either drop Klaxon’s vertical mirroring in
order to honor state Y methods or dishonor state Y’s regulatory goals in
order to decide the case as state X would.
Lower federal courts could play a constructive role in nudging the
state courts to the desired end state. Multistate cases often find their way
to federal court. When they do, we could expect the federal courts to be
more evenhanded in assessing the interests of various states.118 We might
therefore have more confidence in a federal court’s assessment that a
particular state’s interpretive method is the rare one that need not be
followed for legitimate, judicial-administrative reasons. Conversely,
when federal courts manage to apply a particular state’s interpretive
methods, but a state court does not do so, that signals to the Supreme
Court that the state court is being parochial. Finally, even in cases with
no horizontal components, the federal courts can exert a positive
influence by treating interpretive methodology as substantive for Erie
purposes, which they largely do.119
CONCLUSION
Any encounter with another state’s statutes presents a choice of
interpretive law. May the interpreting state use its own interpretive
methods, or must it instead use the enacting state’s methods?
Commentators and attentive courts seem to be converging on the
view that the forum court should use enacting-state methods. I generally
agree with that view, but I attempted here to add some caveats and
nuance. First, it is necessary to consider an enacting state’s interests in
the scope of its methods. Enacting states generally mean for their
methods to follow the statutes, but whether a particular state for
particular aspects of its methodology so means is an empirical question.
Second, I have addressed conflicts between enacting-state interests and
the judicial-administrative interests of law-applying states. In
circumstances of true conflict, the best way to honor the sister state may
be not to apply its substantive law in a compromised form but instead to
avoid adjudicating claims under its law altogether. Third, I have
explained that federal courts can play a useful role in modeling and
encouraging evenhanded compliance. Even besides that, merely raising
awareness of the existence of choice of interpretive law should have the
salutary effect of making attorneys and other courts think about the issue
and hopefully reach the right answers.
118. See generally Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy:
Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639, 658–68 (1981)
(explaining concurrent federal and state jurisdiction as an adaptive response to selfinterest and ideological differences across states).
119. See Bruhl, supra note 20, at 59–60.
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